

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC-02162/87
19 May 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

[redacted]
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Europe[redacted]
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSRSUBJECT: Special Warning and Forecast Report on "Will Gorbachev
Unfurl a New Initiative in Berlin?"

1. Soviet leader Gorbachev's planned trip to Berlin in late May, scheduled only two weeks before the President's visit to the city, raises the possibility of a new Gorbachev-style "surprise" initiative related to Berlin, the German Question, or European arms control. Some Soviet officials have hinted vaguely that Gorbachev could unveil a dramatic initiative during his trip, occasioned by the Warsaw Pact summit meeting. Those hints come against the background of rumors and reports [redacted]

[redacted] suggesting that the Soviets may announce one of a variety of initiatives, ranging from a withdrawal of some of their ground force divisions in Eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia being the country usually mentioned) to a profession of support for the ultimate reunification of East and West Germany.

2. NIO/EUR and NIO/USSR convened a special joint warning meeting of community representatives on 11 May to review the reporting and reach some tentative judgments on (1) what the Soviets might want to achieve with any new initiative, (2) the sorts of initiatives they might float to further such objectives, and (3) the impact that different initiatives might have on European opinion and on U.S. and Allied rights in Berlin. This memorandum reflects the main judgments of that meeting, but it is not a fully coordinated community product.

3. Soviet Objectives. At a tactical level, the Soviets could use the occasion of Gorbachev's visit to upstage anticipated U.S. initiatives on Berlin. A new Soviet initiative would also be consistent with the Gorbachev regime's intent to keep the U.S. off balance through a continuing series of new or reformulated initiatives, particularly on arms control.

CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
DERV MULTIPLE~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

There is virtual unanimity in the community that any Soviet initiative at this time would be designed to support Moscow's current arms control objectives. In particular, the Soviets are looking for a way to defuse resistance in Europe, and especially in Bonn, to the sort of INF agreement that appears to be shaping up in Geneva. More broadly, they are attempting to create further pressures from Europe for flexibility in the U.S. position in the START and Defense and Space talks, as well as INF, by capturing the initiative on arms control issues and putting Washington in the position of being the party that is seemingly impeding resolution of remaining differences.

- These considerations do not preclude Soviet gestures on the German Question or on Berlin itself. It would not cost Gorbachev much to affirm the desirability of inter-German reconciliation or even the eventual removal of the Wall, and he may offer some proposal to facilitate contacts between the two halves of Berlin.
- However, the Community does not anticipate a major substantive initiative on Berlin -- certainly not one that would detract attention from the Soviet agenda in arms negotiations. An initiative on European security or arms control is much more likely.

4. What Sort of Arms Control Initiative?

- A Grandiose Proposal. Most likely may be a move by Moscow to pull together several recent or long-standing initiatives by the USSR and its allies into a single package that could be billed as a plan for ensuring the peace in Europe. This could include elements of the Pact's 1986 Budapest appeal on conventional force reductions, a proposal for a nuclear- and/or a chemical-weapons-free zone in central Europe, and the recent Polish proposal for an expanded MBFR negotiating framework. The recent rumors suggest Gorbachev could propose the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Central Europe. This sort of proposal might be the most cost-free for Moscow, but would be seen in Europe as just another round of Soviet propaganda, and would thus be unlikely to have much impact.
- A Unilateral Soviet Troop Withdrawal. The announcement of a symbolic withdrawal of a division of two of Soviet troops from central Europe could achieve more impact from the Soviet perspective. Moscow recognizes that West European resistance to its strategic arms proposals is fueled by concern about its continuing superiority in conventional forces. Rumors have persisted since last winter that the Soviets plan to withdraw some portion of their troops in Czechoslovakia. There have also been reports of a possible withdrawal of some Soviet forces from the GDR -- ranging from hints of a token reduction (along the lines of the 1979 withdrawal) to less plausible rumors of a major pullback. Alternatively, a small unilateral withdrawal could be combined with an offer of more substantial

SECRET

25X1

- reductions in connection with a future East-West agreement. A withdrawal of this nature would not significantly affect Soviet military readiness in East Europe, and yet, if it proved to be more than a sham, could pay political dividends in West Europe.

5. An Initiative on the German Question. Events of the last few weeks -- Honecker's decision not to visit West Berlin and sharp GDR criticism of West Berlin governing mayor Diepgen -- have dampened speculation about a major Soviet initiative on Berlin or the German Question more broadly. Given the importance the Soviets attach to their own prerogatives in Berlin, a move to alter the status quo is very unlikely. Nevertheless, even a modest initiative could have a major impact. Inter-German relations is the issue of major concern to the German public to whom Moscow is attempting to appeal. Although Berlin does not play the sensitive role of barometer of East-West relations it once did, any significant conciliatory gesture on the status of the city or on relations between the two Germanies could have the same sort of impact of European opinion about Soviet policy that some of Gorbachev's bolder moves on the domestic front have apparently already had. An initiative on Berlin could be aired anytime between now and when festivities marking the city's 750th anniversary wind down in October. The problem for the Soviets, however, will be to craft an initiative that succeeds in advancing Soviet interests in Bonn without an equal or greater setback elsewhere on the continent:

- Statement of Principles on Inter-German Relations. The easiest step for Moscow might be a statement indicating support in principle for improved relations and expanded contacts between West and East Germany. There have been signs over the last few months of an easing of Moscow's earlier resistance to East Berlin's efforts to expand official exchanges. At the extreme, such an initiative could include a vague statement of support for the idea of German reunification--a move that International Department first deputy chief Zagladin recently hinted at. The community is virtually unanimous in stressing Soviet unwillingness to reopen the German Question in any meaningful way. And most analysts doubt that Gorbachev will risk even a rhetorical gesture on reunification, due to the negative reaction the Soviets would expect from France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other countries -- including the GDR itself.
- A Proposal for Expanded Contacts Between the GDR and the FRG. A specific proposal for a modest expansion of human contacts between the two Germanies is a more plausible scenario, and would be consistent with Moscow's positions in the CSCE negotiations. Such a step could allow Gorbachev to hint at a major shift in German strategy without raising the specter of German reunification or tampering with post-war agreements. Some step that would sanction expanded ties between Bonn and West Berlin cannot be ruled out, but we judge this much less likely than an initiative sanctioning expanded contacts between Bonn and East Germany. Such a move would run counter to long-standing Soviet determination to weaken ties between the FRG and West Berlin while strengthening those between the GDR and East Berlin.

SECRET

25X1

- A Crack in the Berlin Wall? A vague statement on the desirability of eventually removing the Wall would not cost the Soviets much; the Honecker regime itself has occasionally expressed such pious hopes. But we judge any substantial measures to be extremely unlikely. Some modest first step that would appear to herald more significant gestures down the road is a more realistic possibility. While West Berliners (even more than the FRG population at large) are strongly supportive of the Western presence in Berlin, they would like to have more freedom of maneuver to expand exchanges with their counterparts in the Eastern part of the city. There are a number of steps that could fit within this general framework; one of the more plausible would be an announcement that Moscow is prepared to expand the number of crosspoints along the Wall. This step would have the appearance of facilitating contacts while still allowing Moscow and East Berlin to control access and egress from the Eastern sector.
- Allied Access to Berlin. We judge any new initiative directly affecting Allied (or Soviet) access to Berlin as highly unlikely. A conciliatory gesture might serve Moscow's objective of appealing to German opinion, but would raise questions that Moscow clearly does not want to raise about its continued adherence to the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement governing the city's status. On the other side of the coin, we believe the Soviets will continue to look for opportunities to circumscribe Allied rights in Berlin, but believe a new initiative in this direction would be counterproductive to Soviet aims at present and would be implausible in the context of a Gorbachev visit to Berlin or a Warsaw Pact summit.
-

25X1

SECRET

25X1

NIC-02162/87

SUBJECT: Special Warning and Forecast Report

Outside Attendees




Gloria J. Kroll
Andrew Cook
Anita Friedt
Robert K. German
Patrick Murphy
George M. White

NSA/A309
NSA/A05
DIA/DE-1
Army/DCSINT/DAMI
Navy/OP-009Y
State/INR/SEE
State/INR/WEA
State/INR/PMA
State/INR/WEA

25X1

Inside Attendees



CIA/EURA/WE
CIA/EURA/EE
CIA/EURA/EE
CIA/SOVA/EAD/P
CIA/SOVA/RIG/SA
CIA/CRES/SEG
CIA/DO/EUR

25X1

25X1

SECRET



25X1

Page Denied

NIC-02162/87

SUBJECT: Special Warning and Forecast Report on "Will Gorbachev
Unfurl a New Initiative in Berlin?"

Distribution:

(Outside Distribution)

1 - DIA/DIO (Dr. Wynfred Joshua)	
1 - DIA/JS-1 [redacted]	25X1
1 - DIA/DC-4A [redacted]	25X1
1 - DIA/AT-2/WE/NATO [redacted]	25X1
1 - DIA/DE-3 [redacted]	25X1
1 - DIA/DB-1J [redacted]	25X1
1 - DIA/DB-5E3 [redacted]	
1 - DoD/ISA (Darnell Whitt)	
1 - NSA/G-5 [redacted]	25X1
1 - NSA/A053 [redacted]	25X1
1 - NSA/G5095 [redacted]	
1 - State/INR/WEA (Robert German)	
1 - State/INR (Henry Myers)	
1 - State/INR/SEE (Robert Baraz)	
1 - State/INR/IC/RD (J. Clear)	
1 - State/INR/OD (R. Clark)	
1 - State/PPS (Director)	
1 - State/PPS (Barry Lowenkron)	
1 - State/EUR (Rozanne Ridgeway)	
1 - State/EUR/CAN (Thomas Simons)	
1 - State/EUR/SOV (John Evans)	
1 - State/EUR/CE (Harry Gilmore)	
1 - ACDA/VI/DI (Raymond Firehock)	
1 - Army/DCSINT (Gloria Kroll)	
1 - Army/ITAC (Goldman/Peters)	
1 - Navy/ONI (Andrew Cook)	
1 - AF/INE (W. Russell)	
1 - AF/INEGL (Terry Jones)	
1 - USMC (LTC Brock/MAJ Budka/LTC Bullen)	
1 - Treasury/OS/OIS (D. Halstead)	
1 - NSC (Tyrus Cobb)	
1 - NSC (Fritz Ermarth)	
1 - NSC (Kevin Latham)	
1 - O/Vice President (S. Watson)	
1 - Commerce/OIL (Lynn Karcich)	